

NSC Review Completed

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Mr. Rumsfeld*

*Walt, the unofficial
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to you.*



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Mr Rostow

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PART I

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FOREWORD

The CIA Reserve Panel's study of the role of CIA in general war, "Nuclear War," published on 1 January 1958, was based on an assumption of a massive exchange of nuclear attacks --- a global nuclear war. During the period when we were preparing that paper, we were also aware of rising official and public interest in limited war as well. Moreover, many criticized our nuclear war paper, despite its stated general war assumption, for the lack of attention given to the CIA role in less than general nuclear war. As a logical consequence, the Panel initiated a study of our role in limited conflicts.

In our initial study we had concluded that the outcome of a general war would be essentially decided by the advanced weapons systems manned by the military. Any CIA role, particularly in the areas of intensive nuclear exchange, was likely to be extremely difficult to carry out, and probably insignificant; the Agency's role in areas not subject to nuclear exchange --- "tactical and strategic islands" --- and in the period after this exchange could be relatively more important.

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We also concluded that the U. S. was more likely to become involved in further limited wars than in all-out conflict. The nuclear stalemate has established a deterrent balance with respect to the latter. Paradoxically, however, by reducing the likelihood that either side would risk such an all-out conflict, it may have made limited wars seem less risky to the Bloc in many parts of the world --- especially in the underdeveloped areas. In the NATO-Warsaw Pact area, where the risks of local aggression becoming general war are so great, the Bloc seems unlikely to attempt to achieve its aim through the use of armed force.

In the underdeveloped areas the East-West deterrent balance is more fragile. The Communist Bloc is concentrating more and more effort on those areas which are in a state of rapid and at times violent political, economic, and social change which renders them vulnerable to Communist "indirect aggression." The Communist offensive in these areas emphasizes economic aid, technical assistance, propaganda using mass front organizations, subversion through the Communist Party apparatus, and Khrushchev's personal diplomacy; at the same time they continue to rely heavily on the force of arms, whether in the

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hands of indigenous rebel forces and guerrillas, pro-Communist elements of the police and military forces, imported "volunteers" or --- as in Korea --- national armed forces. This phase of Communist expansion significantly has provided a more active role for the Chinese Communists, particularly in the Afro-Asia under-developed countries, with increased emphasis on Mao's tactical doctrine. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of "proletarian" military struggle.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. As the U. S. and the USSR enter a period in which their general nuclear war capabilities are roughly comparable, the likelihood of deliberate initiation of general war is decreasing. Paradoxically, however, the very reluctance of both sides to engage in general war may make local war seem a less dangerous proposition.

2. Moreover, in the 1960s the major thrust of World Communism is into the underdeveloped areas where the Communists believe the Western position is vulnerable to gradual erosion by active subversion, armed internal rebellion, and even limited aggression. There may also be conflicts not initiated by the Communists in which U. S. interests might require the U. S. to play a military role.

3. For the above reasons, the U. S. Government, including CIA, must devote much greater attention to the problem of an adequate limited war posture. The spectrum of limited war is extremely wide, ranging from small paramilitary operations in which the nationality of the force employed is concealed to major military operations involving overt forces of several nations. For the purposes of this study, however, it can be conveniently divided into three categories. At the

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lower end of the spectrum we place the covert paramilitary action which in CIA has been termed covert denied limited war (CDLW). At the top of the spectrum is the large overt conflict such as that fought in Korea, in which major national forces are involved. In the middle of the spectrum is a third category which contains elements of both of the others; it can start as CDLW and develop into overt limited war.

4. In all types of limited war the role of the CIA is proportionately far more significant than the role considered possible in a general nuclear war. CIA CDLW operations may, in some circumstances, constitute the major means of carrying out short range U. S. policy.

5. The U. S. is gradually doing more toward the development of a limited war capability. U. S. military commands throughout the world are giving increased attention to contingency planning for numerous limited war situations; but this planning concentrates on the right of the spectrum, i.e., major limited war situations involving the overt commitment of U. S. forces.

6. Moreover, the U. S. is not likely to commit itself overtly

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to limited war in any area in the absence of an attack on U. S. forces or Communist aggression which has reached a point where U. S. national security is seriously jeopardized. Even then, a decision to involve the U. S. in limited war requiring the commitment of U. S. forces will be carefully weighed against anticipated reaction of friendly and neutral nations, and the risks of escalation into general war. And the enemy will seek to avoid presenting us with clear-cut cases of overt aggression which would justify an overt response.

7. Thus the most likely type of limited war with which the U. S. will have to cope falls in the middle or lower end of the spectrum where the U. S. is both least prepared and least likely to intervene openly.

8. Perhaps the chief contribution which the U. S. could make toward developing adequate Free World capabilities to meet middle and lower-end-of-the-spectrum limited aggression, will be through reorienting U. S. military assistance and police-type programs more toward meeting these types of limited war threats. Above all, U. S. aid programs in underdeveloped nations must produce indigenous forces capable of dealing with the methods of subversion and unconventional warfare employed by the Communists.

9. While the Military Assistance and Advisory Groups are

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showing increased interest in police, security, intelligence and PM activities, this process has to date fallen far short of the need.

The deployment of both Special Forces and military intelligence teams to underdeveloped areas during 1959-60 also demonstrates a growing awareness of the importance of clandestine operations and UW techniques in meeting the Communist threat in these areas.

The total commitment of military intelligence and Special Forces personnel has thus far, however, been insignificant when compared to the strength which remains committed to general war missions.

10. CIA [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has in the past two years given increased attention to improving its capability for this type of operation. However, it has not substantially changed the scope and magnitude of the effort. Actions to increase the U. S. capability for carrying out expanded CDLW operations are being taken ad hoc to meet specific critical situations which exist today. There has been no decision made and no action taken to expand permanently CIA's limited war capabilities. Nor has CIA evolved techniques for estimating the likelihood and character of limited war situations which may require CIA operational

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efforts or systematic planning procedures for developing an organic CIA capability to deal with them.

11. The middle-of-the-spectrum limited war, which involves capabilities and competence extending beyond those of either CIA or the Defense Department acting independently, is generally recognized as the type of operation for which the U. S. is least prepared.

12. Although there is increasing awareness among military and CIA planners of the necessity for extending contingency planning to take into consideration the implication of CDLW operations initiated under Special Group approval and carried out by CIA, there is a lack of continuing arrangements between Defense and CIA for joint planning and the development of a U. S. capability to fight the middle of the spectrum type of limited war.

13. The cooperation between CIA and elements of the Defense establishment directly concerned with military support of CDLW (Office of Special Operations in Defense, Special Forces, STRAC, the Marine Corps, the Tactical Air Force, etc.) has improved in the past year, but present arrangements are not considered adequate to meet the complex problems inherent in this type of support.

14. While the President has recognized the need for a mechanism

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to make policy decisions involving covert actions and has established the Special Group to determine when and where such actions should be taken, there is no equally effective mechanism to determine how interdepartmental actions should be carried out in cases where their scope extends from the outset beyond the limited capabilities of CIA. The Department of Defense, though capable of complementing CIA efforts, is preoccupied with all aspects of national defense in the age of ICBMs and nuclear weapons. Even the proponents of a greater limited war force within the military establishment are concerned primarily with the problem of maintaining U. S. forces capable of waging overt limited war.

15. Thus there is an acute need for an efficient joint mechanism for dealing with the middle of the spectrum type of limited war which the U. S. may face in Africa, the Near East, Southeast Asia, or Latin America in the 1960s. To meet these will require both a major CIA effort and substantial support from the U. S. military establishment under conditions which do not permit overt U. S. intervention. The possibility that operations which begin on such a denied basis may subsequently involve the U. S. in overt military actions also makes it essential that CIA and Defense planning and operations be coordinated

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and be related to the overt limited war contingency planning done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the major commands.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CIA should initiate a thorough appraisal of the likelihood, problems of and requirements for meeting small scale conflicts at the lower and middle ends of the limited war spectrum. For practical reasons, this appraisal should be made initially by CIA and then discussed on an interdepartmental basis.
2. This appraisal should include a thorough study of Communist techniques in underdeveloped countries for political/military action below the threshold of overt armed aggression.
3. Following the above appraisal, CIA should press for such steps as seem indicated to ensure reorientation of coordinated U. S. aid, technical assistance and other programs to provide greater capabilities for coping with lower and middle-of-the-spectrum limited wars. These programs should ensure:
 - a. The development in free underdeveloped countries of an indigenous capability to deal with the most likely forms of Communist aggression.
 - b. The development of an adequate U. S. capability for conducting nonattributable U. S. military operations in support

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of friendly indigenous forces in countries threatened by Communist aggression.

c. The development of political action operations, related to our limited war capability, for coping with Communist softening-up techniques which inevitably precede resort to arms.

4. As part of the appraisal recommended above, CIA should review its own potential role in limited wars in order to determine the character and magnitude of the effort which it should devote to these purposes during the 1960s. In the panel's view, CIA should retain responsibility for planning and conducting those operations which are required to be wholly deniable in character and should develop the doctrine and organization required to discharge this responsibility securely and efficiently.

5. On the other hand, CIA should not itself attempt to develop a major CDLW capability for dealing with larger scale middle-of-the-spectrum limited wars. Instead, CIA should attempt to meet this need via cooperative development of a joint capability with the Department of Defense. Specifically, CIA and Defense should establish joint mechanisms for more effectively developing U. S. capabilities and

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conducting limited war operations along the lines discussed in this report.

6. As part of a continuing CIA effort to keep abreast of limited war contingencies, estimates on the character and likelihood of limited wars should be prepared annually by the Deputy Director (Plans) in concert with the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and used as a basis for planning within CIA.

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DISCUSSION

I. THE CHARACTER OF LIMITED WAR

1. Common usage of the label "Limited War" has extended the definition to the employment of armed force ranging from guerrilla action up to a major Korea-type war --- not excluding even the use of tactical atomic weapons. The types of limited war have been defined, categorized and subdivided in many ways. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the responsible body in the Government for defining "Limited War," has thus far not produced a precise and fully agreed definition. Although we find it unnecessary for our purpose to attempt a precise definition, we have found it convenient to identify three categories, each of which poses a basically different problem for CIA ---

Category A.

A limited military or paramilitary operation in which the U. S. role would be covert and deniable --- usually carried out unilaterally by CIA with its own assets.

This category could include fairly large scale indigenous forces in which the U. S. role is limited and confined to the type of support CIA would provide alone. This operation would

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be a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, subject to prior approval of the Special Group and usually the President.

Category B.

A limited military or paramilitary operation in which the U. S. role would be more substantial but still at least quasi-covert.

It could involve substantial U. S. technical assistance, political and material support but no U. S. forces overtly committed in combat. The key characteristic of this middle-of-the-spectrum type of conflict from the Agency point of view would be that it would involve U. S. support exceeding that which could be provided by CIA alone. The responsibility for the operation itself would rest with the DCI, subject to Special Group and always to Presidential approval.

Category C.

A limited war in which U. S. combat forces could be directly and overtly involved.

In this type of war, the CIA role would be governed by the command relationship agreement; CIA assets involved in

the area of conflict would be under the immediate command of the senior U. S. military commander. The responsibility for this operation would rest with the Joint Chiefs, subject to Presidential approval.

2. Because the course --- and thus the magnitude and character of a limited war operation --- can change rapidly, planning and preparation must provide for a smooth transition from one category of limited war operation into another. In the planning and conduct of a minor, lower end of the spectrum or Category A operation, the risk of rapid expansion of the magnitude of U. S. support must be considered. Likewise, U. S. involvement of a substantial nature, though unofficial and quasi-covert (Category B), involves the obvious risk of further extension of the conflict into one overtly involving U. S. armed forces.

3. The fact that Pentagon and CIA planners have concurrently been engaged in an active appraisal of the limited war problem has tended to complicate the task of producing either original or unique work in this field. Much of our work in 1958 and early 1959 turned out to be essentially a duplication of official views produced by individuals directly concerned with developing policies, concepts and plans for fighting localized wars in which U. S. interests are at stake. By early

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1959 it was clear to us that, on the one hand, CIA itself was engaged in an intense examination of the problems of carrying out deniable limited war operations within its own existing capabilities (Category A above), while within the Department of Defense and in Congress there continued to be extremely active debate about U. S. capabilities to fight a limited war (Category C).

4. In both CIA and in Defense the problem of the middle-of-the-spectrum type of limited war had been identified but not subjected to intensive study. We concluded early in 1959 that this somewhat neglected area of the problem was most urgently in need of our concentrated attention and should be emphasized in this study. We have also explored and set aside for separate study a number of specific limited war problems including the role of "volunteer forces," the implications of using nuclear weapons in limited war, and finally the role of CIA in a major limited war where U. S. forces are involved and a "CIA force" is part of a major U. S. military command. We have found this latter problem particularly interesting and are currently preparing a separate study dealing with some of the detailed aspects of it.

5. Even a cursory analysis of the daily intelligence bulletin that is placed on the desk of the President and senior officials concerned

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with foreign policy and our national security reveals that the items selected for their attention fall for the most part into two categories. In the first, one can place the proportionately few items which relate in some way to the capability and possible intentions of the Soviet Union either to launch a global nuclear war or to challenge directly the Western Alliance on issues so vital to the security of the two major powers that a major risk of war is involved. The second category consists of the more numerous daily items describing the recurring crises in the many areas of the world which are often described as the "underdeveloped areas." These areas have in the last decade become the increasingly active flank positions to the central areas, such as Europe, where the Soviet Union and the Western Allies are essentially stalemated in a balance of nuclear and political power. It is primarily in these underdeveloped areas that the problem of limited war has become acute.

6. In a general nuclear war, as we have pointed out, the decisive element is likely to be the nuclear exchange. The comparatively gentle adjustments of force or gray shadings of less than all-out actions will not apply. The character of all-out nuclear warfare stands in sharp contrast to the comparatively delicate filigree which

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is the substance of the limited war problem --- with its intermingling and interdependence of political, economic, psychological, sociological and military influences. The beginning and even the existence of a limited war is not always easily discernible. U. S. entry into limited conflicts in the period following World War II has not once taken the form of a formal declaration of war; even the Korean conflict was initiated as a "police action" carried out on behalf of the United Nations. It is likely that U. S. military historians will have difficulty both in identifying these wars and in pinpointing the precise moment or action by which the U. S. was in any one of these conflicts "at war." Indeed, it is probable that there will be no suggestion that the U. S. "fought" in the armed conflicts in such places as Guatemala and Indonesia in the 1950s.

7. On the basic character of limited warfare and on the vital importance of this type of conflict as an integral element of the pattern of Communist aggression, there is surprisingly little disagreement among individuals or agencies officially or unofficially interested in the subject of limited war. We were, in fact, struck by the emerging unanimity of views in Defense and within CIA on the nature of the problem, on the vital importance of developing a U. S. capability and

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on what we might call the principles of limited war. This does not mean that the CIA and the Defense Department are in the advanced stages of developing a modus operandi for waging limited war --- particularly one involving extensive cooperation or a joint effort.

On the contrary, the existing accomplishments in this field appear to be quite inadequate in terms of what can and must be accomplished if we are to meet the Bloc challenge.

II. LIMITED WAR RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE U. S. GOVERNMENT

8. If we are to achieve a preparedness to respond effectively to a policy decision to commit the U. S. to limited armed action in response to Communist aggression, we must more fully analyze the character of Communist "proletarian military science"; we must determine the proper division of responsibility between Defense and CIA vis-a-vis the various aspects of overt and covert limited warfare; we must find solutions to the problems involved in combining Defense and CIA capabilities to fight the middle-of-the-spectrum limited war. Our solutions must allow for the possibility that any covert effort by the U. S. will expand further into a major, though localized, war involving the overt commitment of U. S. forces and a readjustment in

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command relationships in the field and between the DCI and the JCS. Clearly, responsibility for planning and conducting a limited war in which U. S. forces are overtly committed rests with the military, i.e., the Joint Chiefs. Equally clear is the responsibility of the DCI for planning and conducting CDLW. The decision to commit the U. S. in any type of limited war rests clearly and solely with the President who calls upon either the Joint Chiefs or the DCI, depending whether the U. S. role is to be overt or covert and deniable. The President has established the Special Group as a mechanism to insure State and Defense participation in making decisions that relate to covert actions to be carried out by CIA. The Special Group does not normally concern itself with advising the President on matters related to the commitment of U. S. forces overtly in a limited war operation. A decision of this magnitude would obviously involve the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the National Security Council. In fact it appears that the Special Group, in making or recommending decisions to commit the U. S. to limited war operations, limits its own role as much by the magnitude of the operation as by the covert character of the proposed operation. Thus, it appears that the mechanism for

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making decisions at the highest level to commit the U. S. in limited war exists, is clear, and workable. It is in the planning and preparation, often on a contingency basis, of limited war operations on the lower end or in the middle of the spectrum of limited war where we encounter the most serious problems. We have not developed satisfactory solutions to the problems of estimating the likelihood and character of limited war requirements and identifying the assets and capabilities in Defense and CIA to meet these requirements. Also, in the past we have failed, until forced with specific critical situations, to take concrete steps to achieve a degree of "combat readiness" by combining CIA and Defense assets, to an appropriate degree, into a limited war force.

III. TRENDS IN MILITARY THINKING ON LIMITED WAR

9. Because the role of CIA in any limited war will be directly affected by the attitudes and capabilities of the U. S. military establishment, these factors are vitally important to CIA. The adequacy of the U. S. limited war forces has, of course, been publicly and officially debated at length during recent years. Those who advocate strengthening our conventional forces have been confronted with the immediate problem of competing for a bigger slice of the defense budget with the obvious overriding requirements for the

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weapons systems of general nuclear war. And even within military circles devoted to a policy of increasing our limited war capabilities there remain fundamental controversies concerning advanced limited war weapons systems, the character and balance of ground forces and the political and psychological implications of using atomic weapons in limited war.

10. The U. S. policy of extending aid and assistance to those nations prepared to join us in containing Communism was clearly enunciated by President Truman on 12 March 1947; the military "teeth" in this policy were provided by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Under these acts the U. S. provided during the first half of the '50s twenty billion dollars worth of military equipment and assistance to countries of the free world committed to containing the spread of Communism. The organization, training, arms and tactical doctrine of the indigenous forces developed under these programs were modeled closely after U. S. World War II forces, designed to meet the needs of conventional war.

11. By 1956 the supply of WW II weapons with which we had equipped the indigenous forces of a number of underdeveloped countries, as well as some of our allies in NATO, had been largely depleted; wear and the unavailability of replacement parts would result in many of these weapons becoming unusable early in the period 1959-65. A U. S.

production program to replace and maintain these WW II weapons systems would involve a long-term outlay in excess of fifty billion and an immediate annual expense of more than two billion dollars. The more sophisticated and advanced weapons systems with which the U. S. forces were being equipped were not suitable, for a number of reasons, for the indigenous forces of most underdeveloped areas to which the Communists, faced with a stalemate in Europe, Korea and the Taiwan Straits, were diverting the mainstream of the Communist offensive.

12. In analyzing the "spectrum of activity" employed by the Communist Bloc in its aggression against the underdeveloped area, U. S. military planners observed that conventional military forces, and particularly one bearing a "made in U.S.A." stamp, did not offer an entirely effective response to even all of the various Communist techniques for employing force of arms. Communist political and psychological subversion, subtly exploiting the growing appeal of military neutrality, had tended to erode the political base of the military establishment in underdeveloped countries before such forces had ever been committed to support the strongly anti-Communist regimes that have been backed by the U. S. since 1947. In other areas

when the anti-Communist regime and the Army had attempted to deal with Communist-backed guerrilla warfare carried out from border areas, the conventional indigenous forces, trained and organized for conventional warfare, had proven unable to cope with guerrilla tactics.

13. Faced with these facts and circumstances, a limited number of military planners turned their attention from the concept of large indigenous conventional forces to an analysis of the pattern of Communist armed subversion. The critical moment to successfully oppose Communist forces was, they recognized, when the forces involved --- small groups of armed men rather than large organized armed forces --- could be most effectively handled by security forces or local politically indoctrinated gendarmerie. They also noted that "people and their organization and behavior assume a significance which may frequently overshadow the importance of weapons systems developed and employed to defeat Communist aggression."

14. As an alternative to a large and expensive production program to perpetuate conventional indigenous forces at the achieved or planned Military Assistance Program force goal levels these planners concluded that our Military Assistance and Advisory Groups in these areas should "promote the development of indigenous Special Forces systems for the command and control of paramilitary forces capable

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of performing security missions in peace time and guerrilla operations in war." The concept was further expanded to emphasize the importance of "police-type intelligence in the early stage of Communist aggression at the lower levels of politico-military activity."

15. Recognizing the limitations of the average U. S. officer for carrying out effectively such activities within the MAAG framework, certain planners recommended that the U. S. Special Forces should be expanded to train more officers in UW techniques, that research and development of techniques and weapons for security operations and UW be intensified and, once our own competence in these specialized areas had been established, that we develop (through the mechanism of modified MAAGs) indigenous Special Forces.

16. It is apparent that there is a general feeling in military circles that guerrilla operations are increasingly important and that we must increase our abilities both in establishing such forces and devising counter-measures to deal with the guerrilla forces of the enemy. The recognition of the need for intelligence techniques that ensure the availability of timely information on Communist-backed guerrilla activities --- mainly through the development of clandestine and "police-type intelligence in the early stage of Communist aggression" --- is reflected in the increased interest in the Army for

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military intelligence representation in underdeveloped countries.

17. Thus, by late 1956 and looking ahead to the period 1959 to 1965, a significant shift in thinking on the type and use of indigenous forces in limited war became apparent in some military circles. However, the consequences of this change are not yet fully apparent and, within CIA at least, not generally understood. Moreover, this thinking has as yet had little impact on the Military Assistance Program. Indeed, because these potential changes in limited war concepts are so closely related to broader issues of how the U. S. should prepare itself to fight limited war, and of military versus economic aid as an answer to Communist imperialism in the underdeveloped areas, their implementation is largely dependent on highest level policy decisions. There have been only minor readjustments in the Military Assistance Program to implement the recommendation that U. S. military advisors exert their influence to establish local Special Forces type units which in turn would work closely with if not control local security, police and anti-Communist guerrilla forces. There exists serious disagreement within the Pentagon on the wisdom of such a concept, and the immediately insurmountable problem of staffing MAAGs with officers trained and linguistically capable of this kind of training and prepared to remain in "hardship" posts for extended tours

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has not been resolved. Turning theory into practice has been complicated by the local political and jurisdictional problems existing in almost every country in which the Communist threat is acute. Finally, the unresolved problem of defining, within the U. S. "Country Team," the mission of the U. S. military in the gray area between military and police-intelligence-security affairs, along with the inertia inherent in our large and complex military establishment, have tended thus far to minimize the impact of the 1956 staff recommendations relating to limited war capabilities of most of our friends in the underdeveloped areas.

18. The Army has, understandably, been more aggressive than the Air Force and Navy in acting on the limited war problem, including the field of unconventional warfare. It has produced a paper containing a "U. S. Concept for Guerrilla Warfare." It has developed ideas, if not plans, calling for a "joint UW task force" built around the Special Forces with air and navy support. In limited numbers, Special Forces teams have been committed in training missions in Southeast Asia. However, as the fifties came to an end, the 10th Special Forces were still stationed in Germany training for missions related mainly to a big war; the 1st Special Forces remained concentrated in Okinawa; the

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77th Group, the only other Special Forces unit, remained at the school at Fort Bragg where the curriculum for the basic courses as late as the summer of 1959 seemed to reflect little of the changing thought on limited war.

19. There is evidence in several of the more significant staff documents on limited war that the Army has weighed the relative merits of Army as opposed to CIA developed GW assets. It was noted that the GW concept in the '50s had been oriented toward "enemy held territory" and that "in the past, guerrilla assets have been established largely through the efforts of the CIA." In considering the policy question of whether the Army should mount this type of operation in underdeveloped areas it was noted that "there are no official policy restrictions to prevent the military from taking steps to establish assets by overt means in undenied areas. This would not conflict with CIA."

IV. TRENDS IN LIMITED WAR THINKING IN CIA

20. Those skills and techniques described in CIA jargon as "PM tradecraft" have not always in CIA's history enjoyed the high regard that they do as we begin the '60s with limited war situations confronting us on every side. That a nucleus of PM experience has survived the intermittent periods of uncertainty that have characterized

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the history of CIA paramilitary activities can be attributed more to the recurring crises requiring CIA paramilitary operations than to any CIA policy of developing and maintaining a CDLW capability. In general, CIA has approached its limited war responsibilities on the basis of crash estimates, desultory and short term planning and ad hoc organizational solutions.

21. Within the existing framework and under pressure of developments in Cuba, Tibet, Vietnam, Laos, Iraq and elsewhere in the underdeveloped areas of Africa, the Near East, Southeast Asia and Latin America, there have been noteworthy advances made during the past year or two in strengthening CIA's limited war capability. These can be summarized as follows:

- a. Training and operational activities in both foreign areas and the U. S. have been intensified; CIA's unilateral CDLW capability has been emphasized.
- b. Arrangements for handling Defense support of CDLW operations have been improved and are increasingly concentrated in CIA contacts with the Office of Special Operations.
- c. Direct liaison with Special Forces, STRAC, the Marine Corps and the Tactical Air Force is being established;

cooperation in training, material research and development and in the exchange of information affecting CDLW doctrines and concepts is developing.

d. Some of the major U. S. military commanders in foreign areas are taking CIA's role in various types of limited war into consideration in contingency planning.

e. Internal CIA organizational changes, particularly those within the Clandestine Services, have resulted in some increase in Agency efficiency in dealing with limited war problems.

22. In contrast to the developments in the Pentagon where many of the results of a vast program of research and staff analysis in the years 1956-58 are only now evident in the field, the history of limited war operations in CIA reveals almost no preoccupation in the mid '50s with theory and concept. Under the pressure of events thrusting limited war responsibilities upon it, CIA developed a modus operandi by the process of trial and error. The lessons from Guatemala, Indonesia, [REDACTED] and Tibet are gradually being distilled into a CIA "concept" for CDLW.

23. While there is much that is refreshing and commendable in the Agency's streamlined approach to the conduct of limited war

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operations, there does appear to be a critical need for both systematic, across-the-board estimates on the character and likelihood of limited wars and policy decisions regarding the character and magnitude of the CIA effort. In particular, there appears to be a need for decisions on the two major items on which the future of our CDLW program hinges:

- a. Determining the priority and magnitude of the CDLW program during the period 1961-65.
- b. Achieving an efficient and mutually acceptable arrangement regarding Department of Defense and CIA respective functions and responsibilities for developing capabilities to carry out any type of limited war operation.

V. THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION

A. The Development of Indigenous Forces to Combat Communist-backed Armed Actions.

24. Because the U. S. is not directly involved in most of the armed conflicts which occur in critical areas of the world, neither the JCS nor the DCI has an immediate responsibility for the U. S. actions in these countries to aid indigenous forces in dealing with Communist-backed armed intervention in internal affairs. The ability of the U. S. to strengthen what has been described too narrowly as the "counter-guerrilla" capability of indigenous forces depends in these circumstances

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on the effectiveness of aid and technical assistance programs to local police, security and military forces within the framework of U. S. programs authorized by Congress and carried out through U. S. missions in foreign countries.

25. It is not unusual to find three elements of a U. S. mission (MAAG, ICA and CIA) routinely carrying out separate aid and technical assistance programs which can and should contribute directly to the development of local indigenous forces capable of dealing with some form of Communist-supported armed intervention. Developing this capability in indigenous forces should, we believe, be the primary purpose of all such programs.

26. Because circumstances vary greatly from country to country, U. S. mission chiefs are given great authority and flexibility in determining the local arrangements and procedures for administering this kind of aid and technical assistance. In working out a local modus operandi the U. S. Chief of Mission, normally the Ambassador, will be influenced by local politics, native custom, the general political and psychological environment of the country, the character of existing contacts with the host government and by the abilities and personalities of key officials in his own mission. The personality, convictions and ability of the Chief of Mission are obviously very important factors in

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this situation. In the absence of strong leadership in a mission, the effectiveness of the U. S. effort depends greatly on the voluntary cooperation among the representatives of other departments and agencies in the mission and, in turn, on the guidance each receives from Washington.

27. The centrifugal forces at work within U. S. missions have historically detracted from the effectiveness of our programs which, directed more toward that common end, could have developed local police, security and military forces more capable of dealing with the kind of Communist-armed intervention which confronts them. It can be argued that this end may be neither understood nor achieved by a U. S. mission in which the MAAG chief is preoccupied with building conventional battalions and regiments, the ICA 1290-D representative with improving traffic control and homicide investigation and the CIA station chief with a wide range of other activities unrelated to this problem.

28. Whether the policy guidance going out to U. S. missions has, with respect to this problem, been clear and emphatic remains a question. Because there has been, and probably continues to be, a variety of opinions on the nature and importance of the Communist-backed armed threat to the underdeveloped countries, it seems likely

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that policy guidance to mission chiefs and to departmental and agency representatives abroad has lacked both clarity and emphasis. The recent expressions of concern in Washington about the need for countering Communist guerrilla forces on a world-wide basis may ultimately influence the administration of our aid and technical assistance programs.

29. As we have noted elsewhere in this paper, there are encouraging indications of an appreciation in the State Department, in Defense and in CIA of the magnitude and significance of the phenomena of a world-wide coordinated Communist-armed offensive. Recently the Secretary of State alerted the Government to the increased militancy of the Communist movement and urged that U. S. contingency plans for dealing with Communist-armed aggression at any point in the world be reviewed. The current efforts of ICA to place in the field officers with some UW experience suggest a growing awareness of the potential of the OISP (1290-D) as a program for training indigenous police counter-guerrilla and counter-subversion techniques; however, the lack of adequate provision for equipment for police forces trained by ICA will continue to limit their effectiveness. CIA's role in the 1290-D program also appears in need of a critical review. If ICA has been guilty of

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over-emphasis of conventional police training, CIA may have taken an equally narrow approach in utilizing the program primarily to achieve limited counterintelligence objectives.

30. The conclusion that the U. S. is now energetically moving into an effective program cannot be drawn from these scattered pieces of encouraging evidence. The problem and the nature of Communist-armed aggression are still not fully understood by all of our senior officials; nor do we have, as we move into the 1960s, an adequate U. S. policy and program to deal with it. The full impact of U. S. aid and technical assistance on the ability of a country to deal with this type of aggression will not be achieved until each senior U. S. official concerned with these programs understands the full implication of Communist "proletarian military science," the characteristics of the full spectrum of limited war as the Communists wage it and the need for using the appropriate U. S. programs to develop indigenous forces capable of dealing with this form of the world Communist offensive.

31. It appears to us that the problem of Communist-armed intervention in the underdeveloped countries is assuming proportions which give urgency to action at the highest level of the U. S. Government. There appears to be a need for a comprehensive estimate of

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the Communist-armed threat, an enunciation of the high priority the U. S. accords to Free World efforts to counter it and, finally, clear and forceful instructions to our U. S. senior officials who have responsibilities for aid and assistance to friendly nations.

B. Need for a Joint Defense/CIA Mechanism for an Adequate U. S. CDLW Capability.

32. The functions and responsibilities, the physical assets and the professional skills related to CDLW operations are concentrated primarily in the Defense establishment and in CIA. The State Department has, of course, a continuing and undivided political responsibility,



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33. The problems of developing an adequate and flexible U. S. limited war capability covering the entire spectrum of limited war are those that exist within either Defense or CIA, or those which they share. Those which deal with CDLW, including middle-of-the-spectrum limited war, can in some instances be resolved by CIA alone; more

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often a solution involving a joint effort by Defense and CIA will be required. As an example, the maintenance in CIA of an adequate number of paramilitary specialists whose skills are essentially those found in the Armed Forces (weaponry, demolitions, small marine craft operations, airborne cargo and personnel operations, etc.) is impracticable for many reasons. On the other hand, the military services are not as well equipped as is CIA for developing the environment for indoctrinating, training and utilizing American citizens effectively and securely in CDLW roles. The crux of the problem lies in developing a modus operandi for bringing together the components of an efficient force, trained together and, in terms of administration, security and operational efficiency, organized to conduct CDLW operations.

34. Because the Special Group is the body in which decisions to commit the U. S. to CDLW are deliberated, we first examined, and quickly set aside as undesirable, the possibility of extending its function from policy deliberation and decision into the area of operations, i.e., the implementation of its decisions. To extend its function would confuse and erode the responsibility of the DCI for CDLW operations which is now clear and should remain so.

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35. An examination of the most serious recurring difficulties that CIA faces in implementing Special Group and Presidential decisions to commit the U. S. in CDLW operations clearly identifies the area of CIA and Defense cooperation as the major problem. There is a need for some mechanism to develop and maintain a CDLW capability, including that for larger operations, in which both CIA and Defense are represented. Because of the DCI's responsibility for conducting CDLW operations, such a mechanism must be organizationally subordinate to the DCI and adequately integrated with the CDLW operational arm of the DCI --- the Clandestine Service. Such a mechanism could, through the DCI, periodically report to the Special Group on the status of U. S. CDLW capability to permit the Special Group to act more effectively in its policy and decision making role.

36. The effectiveness of this mechanism would depend from the outset on the acceptance of this concept by the DCI, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. The DCI, selecting the individual to head it, should take these relationships into consideration. At the time the mechanism is established, the head of it should be identified and accredited not only to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, but also to military commanders of U. S. limited war forces including STRAC, the Special Forces, the Tactical Air Force and other

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military organizations with which close cooperation can be rewarding in the development of the over-all U. S. limited war capability.

37. The functions of this mechanism could include but not be limited to the following:

a. To assume primary responsibility for the development of CIA and Defense joint capabilities to wage limited war, including CDLW and middle-of-the-spectrum limited war.

b. To ensure that CIA and Defense research and development projects that relate specifically to CDLW concepts, techniques and equipment, as well as research in the physical and social sciences that is generally applicable to CDLW problems, are coordinated and the results of such projects are given full exchange.

c. To act as a channel for CIA requirements on Defense for support of CDLW operations.

d. To coordinate the use of training facilities, training materials and training instructors related to the special skills and techniques required for CDLW operations.

e. To coordinate the efforts of CIA and Defense to develop indigenous forces in foreign countries capable of countering

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Communist-backed armed intervention.

f. To arrange joint CIA/Defense training and training exercises for U. S. CDLW forces in which both CIA and Defense have components.

g. To study the requirements for joint CIA/Defense CDLW forces and to submit recommendations to the DCI and the Secretary of Defense concerning the need for such forces, and the manner in which they shall be organized and trained.

h. To take whatever actions are necessary at the governmental level, particularly with respect to planning, communications and liaison, to ensure the orderly transition in the U. S. command structure and the exercise of command in the event a U. S. CDLW operation expands into overt limited war in which a U. S. military force is committed.

i. To take whatever actions are necessary at the governmental level to ensure that U. S. CDLW plans and operations are related to limited war contingency planning by U. S. major commands.

38. The mechanism would not have an immediate responsibility for either the actual conduct of CDLW operations abroad or the conduct

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of CIA limited war planning with major U. S. commands overseas. The responsibilities for those should be an integral element of the command responsibility within CIA and carried out through CIA command channels. Its function in organizing and training CDLW assets within the U. S. could be compared with that of the military commands within the continental U. S. A. which organize and train units that are sent overseas to duty under major overseas commands.

VI. THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL ESTIMATES ON THE LIKELIHOOD AND CHARACTER OF LIMITED WARS AND BETTER LIMITED WAR PLANNING

39. One of the most urgent needs within the Agency is to systematize and codify the existing policies and principles which apply to CIA's role in limited war. These should be consolidated in a basic CIA policy and planning document. Such a document should include some authoritative statement of the relative importance of this activity to our other CIA missions. It should describe the nature of our relationships with other major elements of the U. S. Government which are directly concerned. Finally, it should define the responsibilities of the Deputy Directors with respect to policy, planning, supporting and carrying out clandestine limited war operations.

40. The following functions and responsibilities might be

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included in specific delegations to the Deputy Directors:

Deputy Director (Plans) responsibilities:

- a. Initiating an annual operational estimate of the likelihood and character of limited war operations requiring Clandestine Service action. Each area division of the Clandestine Service to prepare an annual operational estimate on the likelihood and character of limited war in the division area; these would be consolidated in the DD/P's operational estimate.
- b. Ensuring that the area division's planning and programming reflect (1) the division's estimate of its own organic capability for meeting its own requirements, and (2) a statement of support requirements in terms of personnel, funds and equipment which would be required to supplement the organic capabilities of the division under specific contingencies.
- c. Consolidating division contingency requirements (i.e., in excess of the division organic capabilities) and determining on the basis of a calculated risk factor the level of support to be centrally developed within CIA against all contingency plans. It is obvious that the difficulty in precisely estimating the time, scope and character of any single limited war plus the possibility that more than a single limited war may confront

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the U. S. at any time, dictates that planning be flexible and imaginative.

d. Coordinating with the Deputy Director (Intelligence), for concurrence of the Office of National Estimates, and with the Deputy Director (Support), for information and planning purposes, the DD/P's operational estimate of the likelihood and character of limited wars in which CIA may be required to carry out operations..

e. Coordinating with the DD/S the estimated support requirements arrived at by the actions described in paragraphs b. and c. above.

f. Coordinating with other U. S. departments and agencies concerning CIA's limited war operational capabilities and support requirements.

g. Developing plans and achieving a capability for implementing the Command Relationships Agreement and the CIA component concept in any limited war theater of operation in which a major U. S. command is overtly involved. This must specifically include the capability for providing the U. S. Commander with information related to the security of the U. S. forces and intelligence information required by the U. S. Commander in carrying out his mission.

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h. Submitting policy questions and recommendations related to limited war planning and operations to the DCI for policy approval. This action will, in case of specific operations, normally involve Special Group clearance.

i. Advising the subordinate elements of the Clandestine Service of actions taken on plans and programs submitted.

j. Carrying out all limited war operations abroad in which CIA is involved.

Deputy Director (Support) responsibilities:

a. Providing personnel and material support to the area divisions at a level consistent with approved division programs to develop and maintain an organic division capability in the limited war field.

b. Providing the DD/P personnel and material support at a level consistent with the DD/P approved contingency program.

c. Conducting training at a level required to support the CIA effort to carry out limited war missions.

d. Stockpiling and maintaining appropriate clothing and equipment.

Deputy Director (Intelligence) responsibilities:

a. Assisting the DD/P in preparation of the operational

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estimate of the likelihood and character of limited war operations in which CIA would play a role.

b. Providing finished intelligence studies to U. S. military commands established to conduct limited war operations in areas in which U. S. forces have not been stationed prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

c. Providing all-source current intelligence support to the U. S. forces involved in limited war operations.

d. Providing personnel support to the DD/P as required.

41. There also appears to be a need for better planning at the interdepartmental level. The decision to commit the U. S. either overtly or covertly in operations involving force of arms is made by the President with the assistance of the NSC. The more limited covert operations are approved by the Special Group. The actions of the Special Group appear to be taken ad hoc and are limited to the policy question of taking certain actions; there does not appear to be a comparable planning function which is carried out by a joint effort of the agencies involved. The established liaison between the Office of Special Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Agency on the one hand and that between CIA and the Office of Policy Coordination in State on the other does not appear to be adequate for this purpose.

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42. Because the type of limited war which may be fought can vary so greatly from one part of the world to that in another, and because the existing situations, out of which limited wars will emerge, differ greatly from one area to another, the major responsibility for contingency planning for limited wars must rest primarily with the component of CIA most familiar with the circumstances in the area, i.e., the area division. Although there will be many elements common to the planning carried out by CIA for limited wars in all areas, the area division's estimate on the likelihood and characters of limited war(s) in its area will decisively influence the type of contingency or limited war plans prepared.

43. In the Far East, Near East, Africa and Latin America growing political instability constitutes an open invitation to Communist aggressiveness. The great differences in the political, economic and social characteristics of these vast areas result in a corresponding variation in the willingness and ability of both the USSR and the Western Allies to resort to armed force to achieve political ends. For this reason we have emphasized the role of the area division in both estimating the likelihood and character of limited war and in the planning and carrying out of limited war operations.

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VII. THE ROLE OF CIA IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THREATENED BY COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

44. The U. S. and her Allies are arming to fight a nuclear World War III that may never be fought while they are losing a World War III that is being fought in a series of battles far below the nuclear threshold. Some of these armed conflicts or limited wars are in fact the military campaigns planned, ordered and commanded by the general staff of the World Communist Movement and tactically conducted according to Mao Tse Tung's "proletarian military science."

45. Others, although started without Communist instigation, may be utilized to serve Communist ends --- Bloc capabilities for the conduct of covert limited war are considerably greater than ours; so too are their opportunities. Although no fire fight occurs and the enemy's supply trains are rarely ever harassed, the movement through Suez of 800 Kurdish repatriates from the USSR, the shipment of Czech and Soviet arms from European ports to Guinea, Algeria and Cuba and the travel of Indonesian pilots to Prague for training are simply the logistics of the world-wide military offensive of World Communism under Soviet hegemony. The foreign military bases are the Communist

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parties, re-enforced where possible by national military establishments under the control of Communist regimes.

46. Of course, not all limited wars, revolutions and coups of the past decade have been Communist engineered or controlled. Corrupt and inadequate pro-Western and neutral governments have been overthrown by internal forces as anti-Communist as the regimes they attack. Unfortunately a change of regime by violence, inevitably followed by economic and political instability, too often contributes to the weakening of the resistance to Communism. The conditions in Iraq in 1958 and in South Korea and Turkey in 1960 were not favorable for Communist-armed intervention. These were not Communist revolutions but only the initial revolt by anti-regime forces which must be observed for vulnerabilities to other milder forms of Communist aggression to be used before the weight of Communist arms can be committed at the place and time of their choice with reasonable expectation of victory.

47. The limited war missions of CIA must be examined against this background and against the assumption that a decision to commit the U. S. to a limited war operation will come only in response to an attack against us or as a reaction to flagrant Communist aggression affecting our national security and the solidarity of our vital alliances.

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A decision to conduct even a CDLW operation is unlikely to come at the stage where the threat of a Communist aggression can still be countered through assistance and aid to a viable friendly anti-Communist regime; it is more likely to occur at the later phase in which the Communists have moved in and established de facto control of the government, creating a threat to U. S. interests that is incompatible with our security. Thus, U. S. efforts to counter Communist-armed aggression against friendly or neutral nations at an early stage will more often be in the form of aid and assistance than in direct U. S. -armed intervention --- even in the form of CDLW operations. It follows from this that CIA limited war missions in most areas threatened by Communist-armed intervention will emphasize (a) collecting intelligence on Communist limited war (including CDLW) capabilities and intentions, (b) contributing to indigenous force capabilities through technical assistance, and (c) preparing CIA contingency plans for U. S. intervention in the form of either CIA CDLW operations or overt limited warfare involving U. S. forces. Additionally, CIA will conduct action operations in the political and economic fields which will strengthen the cause of the anti-Communist forces and weaken those of the Communists.

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VIII. LIMITED WAR MISSIONS OF CIA

A. Intelligence

48. A large though still limited military conflict is probably today the only type of limited war in which intentions are most likely to be detected by traditional intelligence methods. Particularly in the larger and more conventional type of limited war, such as the 1956 attack on Suez and the Korean War, military intelligence assumes its classical historical importance. Even in limited war situations in which the U. S. is not directly involved, intelligence on the military situation of opposing forces may well be the decisive element in U. S. decisions to take diplomatic actions, to take measures concerning the safety of U. S. citizens in the area, to extend additional U. S. aid or, finally, to commit the U. S. overtly or covertly to armed interventions.

49. Conventional military intelligence coverage of airfields, transportation networks and military units remains a reliable method for providing early warning of a large scale limited war. On the other hand, the methodology for satisfying intelligence requirements with respect to an enemy's intentions and capabilities to wage conventional warfare involving large military units and sophisticated weapons systems simply does not apply to limited war operations at the lower end of the spectrum including guerrilla warfare, civil disorder or rebellion and

and coup d'etat. "Early warning" of these is not likely to be achieved by conventional military intelligence coverage; intelligence on these can be obtained only by penetration of such elusive targets as a small group of colonels plotting at the officers' club or students conspiring in the university quarters.

50. Fortunately, the Communists' resort to limited armed force, whether overt or clandestine, tends to occur within the framework of an established pattern of Communist aggression. The actual use of armed force normally comes in an advanced phase of their program to take over an underdeveloped country. Propaganda, diplomatic and economic pressures, and particularly an intensification of local Communist Party activity, almost invariably are employed to pave the way for armed intervention, including covert guerrilla actions.

51. Thus, the earliest intelligence information presaging armed conflict in an area may come from a variety of sources in no way directly associated with the local activities of the armed groups or forces to be employed. The shipment of arms from industrialized countries of Eastern Europe and the training of military technicians in the USSR and its European satellites have until now provided reliable indicators of future trouble spots in the underdeveloped areas. Less

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tangible but equally significant are the political activities and propaganda lines of the CPSU and CPC available largely from overt sources. Probably the most reliable "early warning" intelligence

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52. The analysis required to convert intelligence from these varied sources into timely and reliable estimates must obviously be centralized in Washington. Unfortunately the organization in CIA for collating and analyzing this information is not particularly well suited to the need for operational limited war estimates. Each area division performs a continuing though limited, unsystematic and informal estimative function vis-a-vis the likelihood of a limited war crisis in its particular area. Under the direction of the DD/I both ONE and OCI continuously scan the troubled areas of the world for signs of crisis. Both the DD/P and the DD/I maintain small research staffs exclusively concerned with the problem of International Communism. Under the guidance of the U. S. Intelligence Board, various groups --- notably the Watch Committee --- give concentrated attention to the

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problem of imminence of hostilities. None of these are, however, focused on the particular problem of limited war in its more subtle forms at the lower end and middle of the spectrum. Also, our diplomatic missions abroad have not been and are not likely to be particularly successful in providing "early warning" of either the scope or significance of potential trouble of this type. Because it is the diplomat's function to deal with the government that is "in," he is unlikely to have sufficient contacts to be informed of the developments in political elements that are "out." Thus there is left to the Clandestine Services the primary responsibility for making operational estimates against which to perform its own limited war planning. That these should be projected against appropriate NIEs and reflect the continuing efforts of OCI has been discussed elsewhere in this report.

B. Covert Political Action Operations

53. Once a war has begun political action can, under some circumstances, be as important in determining the course of the war as limited military action or even action involving relatively large forces and conventional weapons systems. It is characteristic of limited war that political factors play a proportionately more

significant role than they would in a general war. Thus, CIA's interest in identifying the political elements in a limited war area is twofold. Before the outbreak of limited war it will, as we have suggested, often be largely from non-military intelligence that we learn of the approaching crisis which leads to armed conflict. Secondly, timely information about and an understanding of the political actions of both our friends and their enemies is a prerequisite to the determination of U. S. action --- whether diplomatic or military. It is difficult to visualize what degree of influence any individual group, regardless of its power, position, or prestige at the outbreak of nuclear war, will have in a society that emerges from the holocaust of an all-out nuclear exchange. On the other hand, the elements of power in the position of an individual or group in a particular country may be expected to remain a factor of calculable importance, during and at the conclusion of a limited war. The technique of clandestinely controlling and influencing the actions of political forces through the recruitment and control of individuals and small groups who themselves have positions of power and influence within a country --- in government, political parties, industry, religious groups and public information media --- is probably one of

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the fields in which we and our Allies, by comparison with the Soviets, are least effective. At the same time, recent history contains abundant evidence of the effectiveness of this technique in those very areas in which limited wars continue to occur. Thus, covert political action operations deserve a prominent position in CIA's arsenal of weapons and may be one of the most effective means of achieving U. S. objectives in some limited war situations.

C. The Problem of Countering Communist Covert Actions

54. Covert action, coupled with an effective use of economic and military aid, constitutes the main thrust of Soviet and CHICOM "indirect aggression" into the underdeveloped areas of the world. The panel believes that Communist covert action operations, including the training of local Communists in Moscow and Peiping, constitute a vastly greater danger to the Free World than do the classical espionage operations of the Soviet/Satellite intelligence services; this is particularly true with respect to Bloc efforts against the underdeveloped countries. It is almost certain that covert action will play a major role in any limited war situation in which the Soviets or CHICOMS have a stake. In fact, it is precisely the problem of Communist covert action aimed at overthrow of existing regimes that confronts the U. S. with

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a substantial risk of limited wars in the 1960s.

55. In this light it is a peculiar fact of our Western intelligence history that we have developed the most elaborate, sophisticated theories and practices for dealing with the enemy's espionage operations (the devotees of which consider themselves --- with considerable justification --- the elite of our trade) and have not devised comparable methods for dealing with Soviet clandestine action. If we can pride ourselves on having achieved considerable sophistication in countering Soviet espionage, we have not begun to develop and apply techniques of what might be called counter-covert action, applying many of the same techniques developed in the field of counter-espionage. The files of CIA are filled with millions of documents containing the details of the personalities, organization, methods of operating and current operations of the espionage efforts of the Communist countries. CIA by NSC directive has an explicit responsibility for counter-espionage. If Communist-controlled covert action is an equal if not ultimately a greater threat to our national security than is hostile espionage, then should we not make an effort to identify and analyze it that is comparable to our CE effort?

56. It is, we believe, relevant to recall that CIA, in the period

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of rapid expansion in Europe in the early '50s rapidly developed substantial espionage and covert action operations, many employing refugees from the target countries. Because we had not yet developed an adequate CE capability directed against the Soviets and the Eastern European satellites and neglected security in mounting these operations, many of them were penetrated if not wholly controlled from the outset by the hostile services. In the atmosphere of urgency that surrounds our own CDLW preparations are we giving enough attention to what the enemy is doing in the same area? [REDACTED]

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Since the purpose of these operations in all countries is ultimately the establishment of a Communist regime, employing force of arms at the time of their choice, this counter-covert action task is closely related to the problems of limited war.

57. In review, covert action operations by the Soviets, Chinese Communists and the Satellites pose one of the most serious threats to the stability of the emerging underdeveloped countries. To meet this threat CIA stations in such areas must give high priority to the problems

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of counter-covert action to blunt the Soviet effort.

D. Propaganda

58. Propaganda operations, whether overt or clandestine, obviously constitute a major element of the total U. S. effort that can be marshalled in support of the U. S. position in any limited war. Because the techniques and problems of propaganda operations vary but little when related to limited war from those related to the general use of propaganda, we decided to deal only summarily in this report with this limited war mission of CIA. The fact that propaganda operations can normally be carried out in any CDLW situation with CIA's own assets and are not part of the problem of CIA and Defense cooperation also contributed to this decision.

59. The targets of a U. S. propaganda effort in a limited war could obviously range from a minor element of one of the belligerents to large segments of world opinion including the increasingly sensitive United Nations Organization. Frequently our propaganda effort would be our first and sometimes our only action taken in support of a combatant element in a limited war to which we either cannot or will not provide more direct support.

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E. Paramilitary Operations

60. While obviously CIA must have a capability to conduct PM operations in CDLW situations, a variety of highly practical consideration limits the manpower commitment that CIA can make to purely PM skills. No one seriously argues that CIA should not maintain a small nucleus of specialists and everyone agrees that basic familiarity with PM operations is desirable in a CIA station chief in an area of the world in which the course of events may be influenced by PM forces.

61. The UW training of CIA agents for either a "hot" or "cold war" reserve and most of the UW training given foreign officials by CIA in either the U.S.A. or foreign countries seems to lie within the existing capabilities of CIA. The CIA cadre of PM specialists is and should be capable of carrying out a continuing research and development program. Finally, it has been and should continue to be possible to divert enough of the limited PM cadre to specific CDLW projects to ensure that CIA procedures, concepts and practices are extended into a task force for a larger CDLW which has been re-enforced by trained military specialists from the services.

62. However, we do not believe that CIA should attempt a

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major program to recruit, train and maintain as PM specialists young civilian staff officers. Its present cadre, largely comprised of officers with World War II military training and PM experience could and should be augmented by selected military officers with Special Forces, Marine or comparable UW training in the Armed Services, permanently transferred to CIA. We strongly advocate basic PM training for JOTs but do not believe that a JOT should specialize in the PM field.

63. Beyond this, military specialists to meet short term requirements in the fields of airborne cargo and personnel dispatch, boat and aircraft operations, weaponry, and demolitions should be provided by the military services; if necessary, military communicators could also be drawn upon to meet the need. The administrative and jurisdictional problems that are entailed in this solution have been briefly discussed in the section of this paper dealing with interdepartmental cooperation. The manpower aspect of the CDLW problem is in fact the single problem requiring most detailed attention.

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